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Recently, new physics for unconditional security in a classical key distribution (USCKD) in a frame of 
a double Mach-Zehnder interferometer has been proposed and demonstrated as a proof of principle, 
where the unconditional security is unaffected by the no-cloning theorem of quantum key distribution 
protocols. Due to environmental phase fluctuations caused by temperature variations, atmospheric 
turbulences, or mechanical vibrations, active phase locking seems to be necessary for the two-channel 
transmission layout of USCKD. Here, the two-channel layout of USCKD is demonstrated to be an 
environmental noise-immune protocol especially for free space optical links, where the transmission 
distance is potentially unlimited if random phase noises are considered. 
 
Introduction 
In quantum key distribution (QKD) technologies [1-15], unconditional security is provided by the no-cloning 
theorem of quantum mechanics using canonical variables, resulting from randomness via the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle [16]. Randomness is the fundamental basis of unconditional security according to 
information theory [17]. In practice, however, quantum loopholes such as imperfect detectors and lossy quantum 
channels are major obstacles, resulting in conditional security as in classical technologies of algorithm-based 
protocols [9-15]. In addition to quantum loopholes, development of deterministic single photons or entangled 
photon-pair generators is far behind commercial implementations. Moreover, the deployment of long-distance 
quantum key distributions seems to not be possible due simply to the non existence of quantum repeaters [18]. 
In addition, the QKD key rate is extremely low compared with classical counterparts, and QKDs are not 
compatible with any classical systems in the real world such as fiber backbone networks and wireless mobile 
networks. Thus, implementations of QKD for practical applications may not be plausible in the near future. In 
other words, unconditionally secured information communications in the real world such as in nationwide on-
line banking via quantum internet [19] are not possible with current QKD systems. 
Since the recent investigation of quantumness regarding anticorrelation and photon bunching on a BS [20-
27], a completely different physics for nonclassicality has been discussed [28-31] and experimentally 
demonstrated [32,33] for a coherence version of photonic de Broglie waves (CBW) and the unconditional 
security of classical key distributions (USCKD), where USCKD and CBW share the same relation as heads and 
tails of a coin [31]. This new idea of coherence quantumness is macroscopic based on bright coherent light with 
quantum superposition of two Mach-Zehnder interferometers via a specific coupling method. So far, quantum 
information has been limited to the microscopic world composed of a few atoms or photons, relying on the 
particle nature of duality [34]. The new interpretation about quantumness on a BS for photon bunching and 
anticorrelation, however, is based on the wave nature of photons, resulting in coherence quantum information, 
where such nonclassical features of anticorrelation, CBW, and USCKD cannot be obtained classically. For 
example, the physics of CBW lies in the controllable higher-order quantum superposition among independent 
Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZIs) [27,32], where the coupling method plays a key role. Like a coupled two-
mode pendulum model in classical physics [35], the quantumness in CBW has also been investigated using a 
tensor product of independent phase bases in coupled MZIs, where the phase bases satisfy the orthonormal 
conditions of a Hilbert space [31]. 
The heart of unconditional security in both QKD and USCKD is in the randomness of eavesdropping for 
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the distributed keys. In QKD, the randomness is in Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle of conjugate variables 
composed of two sets of orthogonal bases, where the no-cloning theorem provides the bottom line of no copying. 
On the other hand, in USCKD, the eavesdropping randomness of orthogonal bases is sought from the path 
superposition of MZI, where the realization of randomness is provided by key distribution determinacy between 
two remote parties via double unitary transformations [28,33]. Regarding USCKD, however, the two-channel 
layout of transmission lines should be vulnerable to environmentally-caused phase noises induced by 
temperature variations, mechanical vibrations, and/or atmospheric turbulences. It is well known that 
sophisticated phase control has been essential for MZI interferometers due to environmental phase noises [36-
39]. Although state-of-the-art laser locking technologies are well implemented for various potential applications, 
active control for phase noises is still challenging and limits the maximum performance of the system. Here, we 
investigate inherent phase noise-immune characteristics of the double Mach-Zehnder interferometer in USCKD, 
where the phase noise-free characteristics can be applied for noise-limited information processing in both the 
wired- and wireless-based communications systems even without an active phase control. 
Results 
 
Fig. 1. A schematic of USCKD. (a) An original schematic of USCKD. (b) An unfolded schematic of USCKD. 
LD: laser diode, OI: isolator, BS: nonpolarizing beam splitter, D: detector, M: mirror. 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗: environmental phase 
noise. The numbers indicate corresponding electric fields. 
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the USCKD, where the environmentally-caused phase noises incurred in 
transmission channels of MZI are perfectly and automatically compensated via a round-trip transmission scheme. 
In Fig. 1(a), the shared transmission channels of MZI between two remoted parties, Alice and Bob, are not 
quantum but classical, where Bob controls the phase shifter φ and detectors D3 and D4, while Alice controls 
the phase shifter ψ and detectors D1 and D2. Here, ‘classical’ means that an eavesdropper can copy the light 
carrier in channels without revealing the eavesdropper’s existence to both Alice and Bob, as allowed in classical 
cryptographic systems. The 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗  represents environment-caused phase noise in each transmission channel, where 
𝜁𝜁1 ≠ 𝜁𝜁2 due to channel independency. The phase ψ is for the light returned by Alice, where ψ is invisible to 
the outbound lights ‘3’ and ‘4.’ This can be easily satisfied with an optical delay line inserted between two 
mirrors on Alice’s side. 
According to USCKD [30], Bob prepares a key with a random phase basis, φ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋}, where the phase 
bases are orthonormal to each other in the MZI system. Alice confirms Bob’s prepared key with her phase basis 
choice, ψ ∈ {0,𝜋𝜋}. Here, Alice’s confirmation depends on a protocol, whether the confirmation can be limited 
to the same bases or all bases (see the Supplementary Information of ref. 30). If the bases are the same each 
other, the double unitary transformation results in an identity relation, otherwise an inversion relation for 
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different basis combinations [30]. This two-channel key distribution process of USCKD is perfectly 
deterministic due to MZI directionality: If Bob’s basis choice is for φ = π, Alice’s detector D1 must click; If 
Bob’s choice is φ = 0 and Alice’s choice is ψ = 0, Bob’s detector D4 clicks. The unconditional security is 
rooted in the superposition-caused measurement randomness in the shared MZI channels [30]. A sophisticated 
Eve, of course, can use the same measurement tool as Bob’s or Alice’s. However, the information extraction 
chance by Eve is 50% on average due to the indistinguishability in the superposed channels of MZI, resulting in 
measurement randomness. To avoid classical attacks such as memory-based attacks, an authentication or 
network initialization process is required [30].  
Using matrix representations, the following analytic derivations are obtained for Fig. 1 (see Section A of 
the Supplementary Materials): 
�
𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼
𝐸𝐸𝛽𝛽
� = [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]1 �𝐸𝐸00 �  
= 1
2
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁1 �
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) −�𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�� �𝐸𝐸00 �, 
= 1
2
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁2 �
1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁) 𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁))
𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁)) −�1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁)�� �𝐸𝐸00 �,      (1) 
where [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]1 = 12 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁2 � 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁) 𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁))𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁)) −�1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁)�� and ζ = 𝜁𝜁2 − 𝜁𝜁1. Thus, the effective channel noise ζ 
due to the environmental phase fluctuations results in: 
𝑀𝑀𝛼𝛼 = 12 [1 − cos (𝜑𝜑 − 𝜁𝜁)]𝑀𝑀0,        (2) 
Likewise,  
𝑀𝑀𝛽𝛽 = 12 [1 + cos (𝜑𝜑 − 𝜁𝜁)]𝑀𝑀0𝑀𝑀0.        (3) 
Thus, the output intensities of 𝑀𝑀𝛼𝛼  and 𝑀𝑀𝛽𝛽 for a fixed φ are time dependent, whose average is bounded by the 
classical limit of 𝑀𝑀0/2. This means that the control of environmental phase fluctuations is critical in MZI 
interferometry [36-39]. 
For the returned light to Bob’s side by Alice in Fig. 1, the matrix representations are as follows: 
�
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
� = [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]2�𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽� �𝐸𝐸𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸𝛽𝛽�  = 1
4
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(2𝜁𝜁2+𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼) ∙  
�
−�1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′��1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓+𝑖𝑖−2𝜁𝜁)� − �1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′��𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁)� −𝑖𝑖��1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′��1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓+𝑖𝑖−2𝜁𝜁)� + �1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′�(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁) − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁))�
−𝑖𝑖��1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′��1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓+𝑖𝑖−2𝜁𝜁)� + �1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′�(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁) − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁))� �1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′��1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓+𝑖𝑖−2𝜁𝜁)� − �1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁′′��𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−𝜁𝜁) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁)� � �𝐸𝐸00 � 
          (4) 
where [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]2 = 12 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁2 � 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁) 𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁))𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁)) −�1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝜁𝜁)�� , �𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽� = �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼 00 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜁𝜁𝛽𝛽� , and 𝜁𝜁′′ = 𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼 − 𝜁𝜁𝛽𝛽 . Here 
�𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽� is the environmental phase noise occurred in the coupling MZI between two main MZIs of [𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]1 and 
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[𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀]2, and the phase noise of 𝜁𝜁′′ can be easily controlled technically. 
(i) For 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0 
For 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0, equation (4) is represented as: 
�
𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵
� = −1
2
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜁𝜁1+𝜁𝜁2+𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼−𝑖𝑖) � �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖) + 1� 𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖) − 1)
𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖) − 1) �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖) + 1� � �𝐸𝐸00 �.    (5) 
Thus, the output intensities for 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0 are as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 = 14 �1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖)��1 + 𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖)�𝑀𝑀0  = 1
2
[1 + cos (𝜓𝜓 − 𝜑𝜑)]𝑀𝑀0.        (6) 
𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 = 14 �1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖)��1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖(𝜓𝜓−𝑖𝑖)�𝑀𝑀0  = 1
2
[1 − cos (𝜓𝜓 − 𝜑𝜑)]𝑀𝑀0.        (7) 
Here, the relative phase noise ζ between outbound (‘3’ and ‘4’) and inbound (‘7’ and ‘8’) lights in the 
transmission channels of Fig. 1 can be different due to time delay, but assumed to be zero for simplicity or for a 
short distance or a slowly varying noise condition. Equation (5) satisfies the identity and inversion relation of 
the original protocol of USCKD with no influence of environmental phase noises if 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0, where the 
intermediate coupling MZI can be isolated from the phase noises (see the Supplementary Information).  
(i) For 𝜁𝜁′′ ≠ 0 
If the intermediate coupling MZI is exposed to phase noises of 𝜁𝜁𝛼𝛼  and 𝜁𝜁𝛽𝛽, then the output fields of equation (4) 
are seriously affected by environmental noises in both ζ′′ and ζ, resulting in lower visibility of identity or 
inversion. The related numerical calculations are shown in Fig. 2 as both functions of 𝜁𝜁′′ and ζ for φ = ψ 
(see the case with φ ≠ ψ in the Supplementary Information). 
For the numerical calculations in Fig. 2, the output field intensities are calculated for randomly varying 𝜁𝜁′′ 
and ζ. Due to the random phase noises between 0 and 2π, the output intensities of 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 and 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵 result in random 
fluctuations between 0 and 1 in the unit of the input field intensity 𝑀𝑀0. To analyze the results appeared in the 
upper panel, output intensities are averaged for all 𝜁𝜁′′ values at each random phase noise of ζ (see the middle 
panel). As discussed above, the output intensities are invariant to the random phase noise of ζ if 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0 (see 
the dotted lines of the left middle panel). Starting from these extreme values, the average values of the output 
intensity 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 (𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵) gradually reduce (increase) from 1 (0) to 0.75 (0.25) as the random phase noise range of 𝜁𝜁′′ 
increases up to π. If the random phase variation range of 𝜁𝜁′′ increases more than π, the average of output 
intensities fluctuate up and down in a small range (see the colored curve bundle circled). These intensity 
fluctuations may be caused by the nondeterministic random values of 𝜁𝜁′′  affecting the output values in 
equation (4). The right middle panel shows ten repeated data for a fixed random phase range of 𝜁𝜁′′ = 2𝜋𝜋, where 
each intensity variation should be reduced as the 𝜁𝜁′′set increases (see the Supplementary Information). The 
interesting results is that the output field intensity values are clearly and completely separated each other and 
unexpectedly stable even under the random phase noises of both 𝜁𝜁′′ and ζ. Because both intensity would vary 
between 0 and 1, the lowest (highest) average value of 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 (𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵) should be 𝑀𝑀0/2 in the average. As a result, the 
average value of the output intensities for all possible 𝜁𝜁′′ are expected to be a half of each maxima, resulting in 3𝑀𝑀0/4 (𝑀𝑀0/4) for 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 (𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵). Thus, USCKD is robust for the key distribution even under full scale of phase noises, 
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where the detection bound for 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 (𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵) can be set lower (higher) than for the optimum case. This is the 
environment-caused noise immune characteristics of USCKD. 
  
Fig. 2. Numerical calculations of equation (4) for 𝜁𝜁′′ ≠ 0 and φ = ψ = 0. At each trial random phase is 
applied, where the r range of 𝜁𝜁′′ varies for a fixed range of ζ. Top row: Individual output intensities for random 
phase variations of 𝜁𝜁′′ (2π) and ζ (2π). Middle row (left): Intensity average over  𝜁𝜁′′, whose random phase 
variation is 0(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑); 𝜋𝜋
4
(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐); 𝜋𝜋
2
(𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐); 3𝜋𝜋
4
(𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐);𝜋𝜋(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒); 5𝜋𝜋
4
(𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑); 3𝜋𝜋
2
(𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏/
𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦); 7𝜋𝜋
4
(𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐); 2𝜋𝜋(𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑). Middle row (right): Repeated (10 times) trials for the range of 𝜁𝜁′′ = 2𝜋𝜋. Bottom 
row (left): Individual intensities for the Middle right: blue/red lines indicate 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴/𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵  for ζ′′ = 19 ; green 
circle/star for ζ′′ = 23. Bottom row (right): Intensity average over ζ, where the random phase variation of ζ′′ 
is 2π (red & blue), π/2 (green & cyan), and π/5 (black) for maximum variation of ζ. 
The left bottom panel of Fig. 2 shows both output intensities for individual ζ′′ by expanding one in the 
right middle panel. The individual full fluctuations in both output fields seems to be obvious due to the random 
phase noises. Thus, averaging effect is extremely important for the intensity stabilization of the output fields. 
Unlike the program setting with random phase noises for a long time period, however, environmental noises 
should fluctuate continuously in a short time scale far less than a MHz rate. In Fig. 1, the phase noise variation 
of 𝜁𝜁′′ should be much slower than that of ζ due to much shorter path lengths. Thus, it is more important to 
understand output fields relation with respect to 𝜁𝜁′′.  
The right bottom panel of Fig. 2 shows both averaged output intensities over the transmission channel 
noise ζ as a function of ζ′′ for different phase noise ranges. The blue and red curves are for the upper panel 
with a range of ζ′′ = 2𝜋𝜋. Like the middle panel, the intensity fluctuations of the output fields are still less than 
1/2 with hardly crossing over the middle line, resulting in a safe separation between 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 and 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵. As the random 
variation range of ζ′′ decreases from ζ′′ = 2𝜋𝜋 to ζ′′ = 𝜋𝜋/5, the ζ −averaged intensity fluctuations are greatly 
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reduced to nearly zero (see the black curves). Thus, the USCKD scheme of Fig. 1 is safe to the environment-
caused random phase noises, where 𝜁𝜁′′ is a technical matter. 
Figure 3(a) shows the related experimental results for the bottom panel of Fig. 2, where the 𝜁𝜁′′ effect on 
the output fields is critical in a slow variation of the phase noise as analyzed in Fig. 2. The fairly 𝜁𝜁′′ −noise-
subdued USCKD has already been observed in ref. 33 for the same setup of Fig. 1. Here, there is no active phase 
noise control in Fig. 3(a), but the setup is just put in a quiet, calm, and closed room. In Fig. 3(a), the output 
fields are averaged by 10 times internally by a Tektronix digital oscilloscope. Under the common lab condition, 
the output fields slowly fluctuate and cross slightly over the half line (see the dotted circle) each other. This 
slight cross-over has been shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 2. 
In Fig. 3(b), such a slight crossover observed in Fig. 3(a) is analyzed with different average number n over 
the random ζ −caused intensity values for a specific value of 𝜁𝜁′′, where 𝜁𝜁′′ is replaced by a linear function 
𝜁𝜁′′ ∈ {0,2𝜋𝜋} . For this, two different average numbers (n=20; 2,000) are compared each other for the 
ζ −averaged output intensities. As analyzed in equations (4)-(7), the output intensities are immune to the phase 
noise if 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0, where this analysis is numerically confirmed at both ends of Fig. 3(b). For 𝜁𝜁′′ ≠ 0, Fig. 2 
shows random phase noise-dependent intensity fluctuations. Unlike Fig. 2, in Fig. 3(b), we deal with averaging-
dependent intensity fluctuation as a linear function of 𝜁𝜁′′ with no noise variation. For n=2000, the output 
intensities are fairly stable regardless of 𝜁𝜁′′ (see the green and cyan curves). For n=20, however, the output 
field fluctuations gradually increase as 𝜁𝜁′′ increases from 0 to π and then reduced down symmetrically. Here, 
𝜁𝜁′′ = 𝜋𝜋 stands for a maximum noise to the system according to equation (4). Thus the crossover in Fig. 3(a) is 
explained with the low averaging number in Fig. 3(b). This result is quite interesting because an active phase 
control has been intensively sought in interferometry [36-44]. Both high number of averaging in Fig. 3(b) and 
low noise range of 𝜁𝜁′′ in the right bottom panel of Fig. 2 give a great potential not only for USCKD benefit but 
also for general benefit to conventional interferometry especially for the highly stable locking system including 
gravitational wave detection. 
 
Fig. 3. Experimental demonstrations of equation (4) for 𝜁𝜁′′ ≠ 0. (Left) Experimental results for the average of 
n=10. (Right) Numerical analysis for random phase noise variation of ζ′′ with averaging for n=20 (blue and red) 
and n=2,000 (cyan and green). 
Discussion 
Unlike the one-way MZI system of equations (1)-(3) [38,39], equation (4) is for the round-trip MZI system of 
Fig. 1 representing the environmental noise effect on USCKD. As analyzed in equations (5)-(7), the 
transmission channels of the shared MZIs of USCKD satisfies environmental noise-immune property by 
inherent self-noise cancellations if 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0. Because the intermediate coupling MZI for 𝜁𝜁′′ = 0 is easily 
obtained by the state-of-the-art laser locking technologies, the output intensity noise fluctuations of the USCKD 
can be fairly subdued no matter how big the channel noise is as shown in Fig. 2. Even with full random noise in 
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the intermediate MZI, both averaged output intensities are pretty stable and fairly separated to be applied for the 
key distribution of USCKD. If the environmental noise varies slowly so that large averaging is not possible for 
fast key distribution process comparable to the round-trip travel time, then the output values slightly cross over 
the half line. Instead of 𝜁𝜁′′ noise isolation by an active or passive control, intentionally added random phase 
noise would be a rough solution. Moreover, well random noise averaged output intensities show a distinct 
separation between two regions. As a result, the schematic of USCKD in Fig. 1 suffices the environmental 
noise-immune system for both fast and slow noise environments. This environmental phase noise-immune 
property of the present USCKD system has a novel feature especially for the free-space key distribution, where 
atmospheric fluctuations have been a critical obstacle for the optical link in both quantum [41-43] and classical 
[44,45] communications. 
Conclusion 
We analyzed, discussed, and experimentally demonstrated the environmental noise-immune USCKD protocol in 
a coherence scheme of classical physics, where the phase noise to the long pair of transmission lines of MZI is 
inevitable in practice. The noise immune USCKD is due to self-compensated phase noise in the round-trip MZI 
configuration, where the round-trip scheme is for the identity and inversion relation via double unitary 
transformation. However, the phase fluctuations in the intermediate coupling module between the inbound and 
outbound MZI channels were serious to demolish the USCKD protocol if the noise is slowly varying or the 
processing is fast enough not to average fair numbers. Such a phase noise can also be passively controlled by 
inserting on-purpose random noises to the system. Although perfect noise immune USCKD can be reached with 
zero phase noise in the intermediate coupling MZI, such purity of USCKD can also be a defect to the diagnosis 
of the transmission lines from attacks. Based on free space optical links limited by a few km distance, the 
demonstrated phase noise-immune USCKD configuration shows a great potential for ground-to-satellite optical 
links as well as ground-to-air optical links. Thus, the present demonstration may open the door to a new realm of 
secured information communications beyond both classical and quantum security.  
Methods 
Numerical calculations: In Figs. 2 and 3, home-made Matlab programs are used for numerical claculations, 
where the random phase noise is obtained from the rand(1) commend. In Fig. 2, various phase noise range was 
controlled by multiplying a certain number to the output of rand(1). 
Experiments: In Fig. 3(a), the wavelength of laser is 606 nm from Toptica TA-SHG pro, but not limited. The 
optical power of the input light is ~1 mW. After division by the first beam splitter in Fig. 1, each channel was 
controlled by each AOM driven by synchronized rf generators (PTS 160/250; Tektronix AFG3102), resulting in 
same initial phase (see ref. 29 for details). The data was captured in the screen of an oscilloscope (Tektronix 
DPO 5204B) via avalanche photodiodes (Hamamatsu C12703). 
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